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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH, RICH COUNTY, ( 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ( 
vs. ( 
) Case No. 970596-CA 
LARRY H. BREITWEISER, ( 
Defendant and Appellant. ( Priority No. 2 
An officer approaches an accident to find a person pinned in a rolled-over 
vehicle. The concerned officer calls for medical services for the injured person. 
During the course of the accident investigation, the officer claims to detect the odor of 
alcohol and arrests the injured driver for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol 
("DUI"). 
During the suppression hearing, die court suppresses evidence for lack of 
probable cause, but determines the injured driver had voluntarily consented to the blood 
draw for the officer's chemical test. Based thereupon, the blood test results were 
admitted and the trial convicted the driver of DUI. 
Further, during trial the jury convicted the driver on the premise that the 
driver cannot operate a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of .08 % or 
greater. However, the law does not provide for a percentage determination rather the 
law specifically provides that a person may not operate or be in actual physical control 
of a vehicle if the person has a blood concentration of .08 grams or greater as shown in 
a chemical test of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. Based upon this plain error the 
defense moved for a arrest of judgment, but the court denied said motion. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 
(1997) (2)(3) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony). The Appellant appeals the final order 
and judgment of the First Judicial District Court, in and for Rich County involving his 
conviction of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B Misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953, as amended). 
2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(1) Whether there was sufficient attenuation between the illegal arrest of 
Mr. Breitweiser and the blood draw? 
(2) Whether the consent to the blood draw was voluntary and without 
duress or ? 
(3) Whether the trial court properly denied Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to 
Arrest Judgment? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
(1) - (2) The trial court erred by denying Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to 
Suppress Evidence. The State failed to show reasonable attenuation between the illegal 
arrest and the blood draw, and the blood draw by the EMT were privileged. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. "We 
review the factual findings underlying a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress 
under a clearly erroneous standard/' State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). We review the trial court's conclusions based on the totality of 
those facts for correctness. See id. 
State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1997). 
(3) The trial court erred by denying Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Arrest 
Judgment. The State failed to show reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and exigent 
circumstances in this case. The elements of the offense presented at trial are not 
consistent with the law that reasonable minds could conclude that Mr. Breitweiser 
3 
should be found Guilty of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. Further, Utah Law 
requires that all the elements of the crime to proven beyond reasonable doubt in order 
to rebut the presumption of innocence. 
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a trial court may 
arrest judgment "if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense." 
The standard for determining whether an order arresting judgment is erroneous is 
the same as that applied by an appellate court in determining whether a jury 
verdict should be set aside for insufficient evidence. Under that standard, a trial 
court may arrest a jury verdict when the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an 
element of the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt as to that element. State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); State v. 
McCardell 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982); State v. Romero. 554 P.2d 216, 219 
(Utah 1976). 
State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7. Utah Const, art., § 12. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14. 4th Amend., U.S. Const. 
5th Amend., U.S. Const. 14th Amend., U.S. Const. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (1953, as amended). 
UtahR. ofEvid. 506. 
[Included herewith in Addendum A.] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case: 
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This case arises from an appeal of the Final Judgment and Guilty Verdict 
of Mr. Breitweiser for Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class B Misdemeanor. (R. at 
107-08). 
//. Course of the Proceedings: 
On October 25, 1996, an Information was filed and Mr. Breitweiser was 
arraigned in open court wherein he pled Not Guilty. (R. at 7). On March 7, 1996, D. 
Bruce Oliver entered his appearance and placed Mr. Breitweiser's jury demand. (R. at 
20). On April 14, 1997, the court set trial to convene on Monday, July 7, 1997 at 
10:00 a.m. (R. at 42). On June 30, 1997, the defense filed Mr. Breitweiser's Motion 
to Suppress Evidence. (R. at 44-61). On July 7, 1997, the trial court held both the 
suppression hearing, followed by the jury trial. 
During the suppression hearing, the trial court found that the officer 
lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Breitweiser. However, the trial court also 
determined that Mr. Breitweiser consented to the blood draw. 
///. Disposition in Trial Court: 
The trial court denied Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Suppress Evidence and 
then the jury convicted him of DUI. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied 
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Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Arrest Judgment. Said motion was filed on the basis that 
the Information filed and the instructions to the jury establishing the elements of the 
crime were not consistent with one another. Moreover, the Information is not 
consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953, as amended). The court denied the 
motion claiming Mr. Breitweiser was being very narrow in his focus and denied same 
because there was a lot of evidence that was introduced. (R. at 133(329}). 
IV. Statement of Facts: 
(A) From the report: 
This matter involves an accident and simply the odor of alcohol and 
whether these facts constitute probable cause for an arrest. Deputy Dale Stacey's 
report reads: 
I came across the vehicle on regular patrol. It was off the road and appeared to 
have been rolled. Mr. Breitweiser was trapped under the vehicle. I immediately 
called for an ambulance and extrication equipment. We were able to get him 
out. I could smell alcohol on him. I asked if he had been drinking. He stated 
that he had a couple of beers. I placed him under arrest for DUI and requested a 
blood test. He agreed to it and Kerry Stacey drew a sample of blood. 
(R. at 8). 
Subsequently, the report reads: 
Mr. Breitweiser, do you understand that you're under arrest ? . . . for Driving 
Under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. 
(R. At 35). Additionally, the report states: 
Facts establishing the subject's actual physical control of the motor vehicle are: 
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The vehicle was wrecked. He said he was the only person in the vehicle. 
(R. at 35). Finally, on the last page, the report states that when asked if he had been 
drinking, Mr. Breitweiser's response was: 
Yes, I've had a couple of beers. 
(R. at 35). [See Report, Addendum B]. 
(B) From testimony.1 
Deputy Dale Stacey was proceeding west on State Road 39, and it runs 
approximately 20-22 miles between Woodruff and Monte Cristo, when he happened up 
to an accident. (R. at 108). Before arriving at the scene, the deputy passed three or 
four other vehicles who were traveling eastbound while he was traveling westbound. 
He concluded that the accident had just occurred as none of these other vehicles had 
stopped to assist prior to his arrival. The location of the accident was approximately 
six or seven miles from Woodruff. (R. at 109). The terrain for this area is mostly 
fields and summer range grounds for livestock. Also, the road at the scene has a small 
bend with a small incline then it straightens out. (R. at 109). 
Mr. Breitweiser's vehicle was observed to be in the field to the south side 
of the road right side up. The officer initially believed that a rancher must have driven 
it to that position but then felt that it was too close to the fence so he stopped to 
1
 The record does not comport with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
as the trial transcript does not have a sequential number on each of the pages. Therefore 
in this section, the appellant uses the original transcript page in referring to a cite to the 
record. 
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investigate. (R. at 110, 130). As he approached the vehicle he noted some damage to 
the vehicle,2 the vehicle was right side up, situated on its wheels. He also, observed 
some stuff scattered along the shoulder off to the side of the roadway. Also, some skid 
marks were noted on the road surface leading to the vehicle. (R. at 110). But the 
officer could not see any apparent cause for the accident. (E.g., like a dead animal in 
the roadway or on the shoulder. (R. at 117)). 
The officer walked down the small embankment and climbed a fence 
where the officer soon believed that the vehicle appeared to have gone through, because 
it was on the other side of the fence. As he climbed the fence a dog approached him 
and started growling, so the officer began talking to the dog, when he heard someone 
faindy say, "Hello." The officer asked the voice where he was at, the voice 
responded, "I don't know." The officer could not see the man, there was tall grass and 
two ditches in the vicinity. He then started looking for the person while continuing to 
talk with the man. The deputy finally located the man by crawling through the tall 
grass. (R. At 111-12). The man, Mr. Breitweiser, was located pinned under the 
vehicle, while the truck's front wheels were in the first ditch and the rear wheels were 
in the second ditch. (R. at 112-13, 129). Mr. Breitweiser was also located in the 
second ditch under the tire. 
2
 Admittedly though, the deputy could not tell whether the damage was fresh or old, only 
extensive. (R. at 132). The officer didn't attempt to determine whether the damage was free. (R. 
at 133). 
8 
When the officer located Mr. Breitweiser, only a limited conversation 
ensued as he complained of some chest pains so the officer indicated that he was going 
back to his squad car to call for an ambulance. While at his vehicle, he also requested 
for extrication equipment. (R. at 113-14). The officer then returned to Mr. 
Breitweiser's truck and asked him medical related questions (e.g, whether he was 
hurling, had back pain, etc.). Mr. Breitweiser responded that he was pinned, he had 
chest pains, and he couldn't move his arms. The one rear tire was slightly resting on 
Mr. Breitweiser's forehead, but the front tire in the ditch kept the vehicle from rolling 
back onto his head more. (R. at 115). Because, the deputy didn't know if he suffered 
from a spinal injury that he wasn't going to move him until the ambulance, extrication 
equipment, and back immobilization equipment arrived at the scene. (R. at 116). 
Approximately 10-15 minutes later, Officer Jim Gregory, of fish and 
game, arrived at the scene to assist, (r. at 117), and they walked around the scene. The 
ambulance did not arrive for approximately 25 minutes after Deputy Stacey's arrival. 
Mr. Breitweiser was removed from under the vehicle, by the men, EMT Kerry Stacey3 
crawled underneath and steadied Mr. Breitweiser's head while the others pulled him 
from underneath the truck onto a backboard. (R. at 119). Then they carried him to the 
ambulance. During this time, Deputy Stacey smelled what he believed to be the odor 
of alcohol. (R. at 120). While in the ambulance, he got closer to Mr. Breitweiser to 
3
 Deputy Stacey's brother. 
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see if he could smell the odor again, and he did so he asked him if he had been 
drinking. Mr. Breitweiser stated that he had a couple of beers. (R. at 120). Based 
exclusively thereupon, the deputy placed Mr. Breitweiser under arrest and asked him if 
he would submit to a chemical test. (R. at 120). Mr. Breitweiser responded in the 
affirmative, stating, "Yes." The deputy was not the one who drew the blood, rather it 
was his brother, Kerry Stacey who drew the blood. (R. at 121). 
In trial, the deputy was asked what he thought had caused the accident and 
the response was that it just appeared to the officer that Mr. Breitweiser had driven to 
the left, over corrected and veered back to the right, (r. at 121), but he agreed that it 
was possible that Mr. Breitweiser could have simply driven through the turn because he 
was distracted, changing the radio station or getting a soda. (R. at 141). Deputy 
Stacey also conceded that it could have been possible that an animal, such as a deer, 
may have been in the road, (r. at 142-43), or even that Mr. Breitweiser could have 
been dozing off. (R. at 156). Moreover, the deputy failed to check for mechanical 
failure. (R. at 156). Meanwhile, while still pinned under the truck tire, Deputy Stacey 
asked Mr. Breitweiser what had happened but he reported that he didn't know. (R. at 
121). 
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The blood draw was taken approximately, 8:40 to 8:45 p.m.4 and just 
after he had placed Mr. Breiweiser under arrest. (R. at 149). This was approximately 
an hour after Deputy Stacey arrived at the scene. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Firsdy, Deputy Stacey could not arrest Mr. Breitweiser because the 
accident and the coupled odor of alcohol fails to rise to the level of probable cause and 
such "paucity of facts" available to him simply did not justify the arrest. The 
articulable facts available severed the chain of rational inference from specific 
articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt to support an as yet "inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch/" 5 Therefore, the trial court erroneously denied 
Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
Secondly, the blood test in which Mr. Breitweiser submitted to was not 
voluntary. Moreover, the state fails to overcome the argument of reasonable 
attentuation after the unlawful arrest as well as it failed to overcome the presumption 
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights by convincing evidence that such 
rights were waived as required by State v. Harmon.6 Therefore, the trial court 
4
 Approximately 20 minutes after arriving at the scene. (R. at 124). 
* State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994); People v. Roybal, 672 P.2d 1003 
(Colo. 1983). 
« State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037 (Utah App. 1993). 
i i 
erroneously denied Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
Finally, the State failed to present evidence establishing all the elements 
of the offense charged. The State's case consisted of evidence that Mr. Breitweiser was 
guilty of having a blood-alcohol consentration of .08% or greater. However, the 
statute specifically prohibits an accused from having a blood-alcohol consentration of 
.08 grams or greater of alcohol per 100 mililiters of blood. Therefore, the trial court 
erroneously denied Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Arrest Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEPUTY LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST MR. BREITWEISER. 
A. Introduction. 
Article I Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution provides that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, 
(emphasis added) 
Utah Const, art. I § 14. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is identical on 
content. 
B. Preface. 
As a result of a hearing on Mr. Breitweiser's Motion to Suppress 
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Evidence the trial court ruled that there was insufficient probable cause to believe that 
he was operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol to arrest him for said 
charge. (R. at 132{45}). To answer the question posed by Point I, we must analize this 
point from two separate perspectives. The first aspect of analysis is: Was there 
sufficient attenuation between the illegal arrest of the defendant and the blood draw? 
The second aspect of analysis is: Was the blood draw and results privileged? 
C. Was there sufficient attenuation between the illegal arrest of the 
defendant and the blood draw? 
In determining whether or not there is sufficient attenuation between the 
illegal conduct of the police and the subsequent conduct of the police there are a few 
factors to be considered. The Utah Court of Appeals has reiterated the enumerated 
factors in State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433 (Utah App. 1996) wherein they stated: 
The Utah Supreme Court has established several factors that the 
reviewing court must examine in evaluating the attenuation issue: 
temporal proximity of the initial illegality and the consent in 
question, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the 
purpose and flagrancy of the illegal misconduct. State v. Arroyo, 
796 P.2d at 690-91 n.4; see also State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 150 
(Utah App. 1991), cert, dismissed, 881 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994). 
In Ham, the Court was dealing with consent obtained after a prior illegality by the 
police. The issues for this case are the same. 
The first issue addressed by the court is "temporal proximity of the initial 
illegality and the consent in question." In this case, the temporal proximity is very 
13 
close, if not identical to the illegal conduct of the police. There is no substantial 
change in the temporal proximity. The illegal arrest took place at the scene of the 
accident and the subsequent blood draw as well took place at the scene of the accident. 
(R. at 132(120}). 
The second factor is "the presence of intervening circumstances." There 
is no intervening circumstance which untaint the prior illegal conduct of the police. 
The police arrested on the odor of alcohol, there was no additional evidence collected 
which would enhance the situation or act as an intervening circumstance. Clearly the 
immediate statement that he is under arrest followed by the request to draw blood leads 
one to believe that he'd better go easy because he was already under arrest, no one in 
Mr. Breitweiser's condition would want the officer to become physical. The arrest 
statement is an attempt to demonstration police authority, and implicidy conveys a 
threat. 
The final enumerated factor is: "the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal 
misconduct." The officer obtained the consent to draw the blood from Mr. 
Breitweiser. The consent was obtained at a time when Mr. Breitweiser had been 
seriously injured as a result of the automobile accident he had been in. He had been 
trapped underneath his own vehicle for a substantial period of time with his truck tire 
situated on his head, prior to the discovery of the accident by the police. Mr. 
Breitweiser had to be extricated from underneath the vehicle and then they immediately 
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placed him in an ambulance on a backboard. The same person, Kerry Stacey,7 who 
assisted in the extrication was the one who drew the blood for testing and who 
administered an IV to provide Mr. Breitweiser with medical fluids. 
Clearly, the arresting officer was on a fishing expedition. He did not 
possess sufficient objective facts to support probable cause to legally effectuate an 
arrest, and simply wanted to draw blood to enhance his case. The arresting officer 
performed no field sobriety tests. The arresting officer did not even give the 
admonition as required by the DUI Report Form filled in by the officer. (R. at 132{20, 
35})(see Report attached, Addendum B). At no time was Mr. Breitweiser advised of 
his Miranda Rights. The general conduct of the officer is clearly indicative on an 
officer who was just on a fishing trip and had no real probable cause to arrest Mr. 
Breitweiser or to draw his blood. 
There was not sufficient attenuation between the officer's illegal conduct 
and the blood draw as to remove the taint of the consent to the blood draw and allow 
the results to be admitted at trial. The trial court's decision to admit into evidence the 
blood draw results and not to suppress it was clearly erroneous. In State v. Lopez, 831 
P.2d 1040 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this Court granted the State an interlocutory appeal of 
a traffic stop that did have sufficient attenuation. This is the case that resulted in the 
Utah Supreme abandoning pretext doctrine. Upon certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court 
7
 The arresting officer's brother. 
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in State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) ruled that the pretext doctrine was not 
needed and does not give additional Fourth Amendment protection because the conduct 
of the officer must remain within the scope of the inception of the contact unless 
supported by further probable cause to detain longer. 
In this matter, the trial court allowed the blood test results to be admitted 
based upon Utah Code Annotated Section 44-6-44.10. The trial court improperly relied 
on this section in making its determination that the test results were admissible. This 
provision of the law which is commonly refered to a implied consent law deals with the 
authority of the Driver's License Division's ability to take enforcement action against 
individuals who refuse to cooperate with the police in a DUI situation. This part of the 
law is not intended to modify the Constitution of the United States or of the State of 
Utah as the judge implied and ruled. (R. at 132(41-45}), Addendum C). In this 
matter, the trial court should have suppressed the results. Nonetheless, the blood 
drawn ws also protected under the Patient-Physician previlege. 
D. Was the blood draw and results privileged? 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 506 provides: 
Rule 506. Physician and mental health therapist-patient. 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) "Patient" means a person who consults or is examined or interviewed 
by a physician or mental health therapist. 
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably believed by the 
patient to be licensed, to practice medicine in any state. 
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(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or is reasonably 
believed by the patient to be licensed or certified in any state as a physician, 
psychologist, clinical or certified social worker, marriage and family therapist, 
advanced practice registered nurse designated as a registered psychiatric mental 
health nurse specialist, or professional coimselor while that person is engaged in 
the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition, including alcohol 
or drug addition. 
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information is communicated in confidence 
and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a 
privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other 
person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, 
by a physician or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by 
examination of the patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a 
physician or mental health therapist, and persons who are participating in the 
diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health 
therapist, including guardians or members of the patient's family who are 
present to further the interest of the patient because they are reasonably 
necessary for the transmission of the communications, or participation in the 
diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health 
therapist. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the 
patient, or the guardian or conservator of the patient. The person who was 
the physician or mental health therapist at the time of the communication 
is presumed to have authority during the life of the patient to claim the 
privilege on behalf of the patient. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a communication 
relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient 
in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense, 
or, after the patient's death, in any proceedings in which any party relies upon 
the condition as an element of the claim or defense; 
(2) Hospitalization for mental illness. For communications relevant 
to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if 
the mental health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has 
determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization; 
(3) Court ordered examination. For communications made in the 
course of, and pertinent to the purpose of, a court-ordered examination of 
the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party 
or witness, unless the court in ordering the examination specifies 
otherwise. 
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Id. The type of a relationship existing between Kerry Stacey and Mr. Breitweiser is 
covered in Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 506. The information gleaned during the 
treatment of Mr. Breitweiser by any treating medical personnel, including Kerry 
Stacey, is privileged and as such should not be disclosed without Mr. Breitweiser's 
expressed consent knowing that such statement woulkd constitute a waiver, which in 
this case was not given freely, knowingly, and intelligendy. The blood draw in the 
ambulance was consented to pursuant to threat, implied or expressed, as a result of the 
immediately preceding arrest statement. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037 (Utah 
1993), addressed the issue of consent and articulated the test to use in determining: 
Harmon also alleges the trial court incorrectly concluded that her consent 
to search her home was voluntary because the consent was not freely 
given but instead was a product of coercion and duress. Consent to search 
is valid under the Fourth Amendment if (1) the consent was voluntarily 
given, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the 
prior illegality. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993); 
Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 918. We apply a correction of error standard 
when a defendant challenges the "legal content" of the trial court's 
ultimate conclusion that a consent was voluntary or involuntary. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. The trial court's factual findings will not be 
set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Id; Barnhart, 210 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 35. 
Whether consent to search was voluntarily given is determined from the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the consent, including the 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the police conduct. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263; State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah 
App. 1990). In order for consent to be voluntary, (1) there must be clear 
and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal, specific, and 
freely and intelligently given; (2) the government must prove consent was 
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given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) the courts 
must indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence 
that such rights were waived. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 
1990), aff d. 1993 WL 176211 (1993). 
Id In the case at hand, the State cannot prove that the consent to the blood draw was 
voluntarily given consistent with Harmon. Under the existing circumstances, the 
consent surely was given under duress and unintelligently. The Utah Supreme Court in 
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, (Utah 1980) provided the test to determine duress. 
The Court stated: 
Factors which may show a lack of duress or coercion include: 1) the absence of 
a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of 
force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of 
the vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer. 
Id. It is clear to show on its face that the consent was under duress. The officer told 
Mr. Breitweiser that he was under arrest for Driving Under the Influence and then 
immediately asked him to submit to a chemical test. After just being pinned underneath 
his truck by his head, it is equally clear that Mr. Breitweiser may not have been in the 
frame of mind to reason the question and ponder his rights! 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the conviction, the 
evidence of the blood consentration results should have been suppressed. 
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POINT II. 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
THE MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT. 
After trial and before sentencing, Mr. Breitweiser moved to arrest 
judgment. This Motion was made pursuant to Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which provides as follows: 
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment. 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative 
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or 
admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or 
there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment 
the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense charged is entered or 
jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the defendant is charged anew 
or retried, or may enter any other order as may be just and proper under the 
circumstances. 
Id The question posed by this case is whether the State produced sufficient evidence 
to show that a public offense had been committed. The jury had been instructed that 
the elements of the offense for which a conviction could be determined would be the 
.08 provision of the law. (R. at 76); (Addendum D). 
At the time of trial herein both the evidence as well as the Information 
charged Mr. Breitweiser of having a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater. In 
addition thereto the instructions to the jury required the finding of .08 grams Alcohol 
Content or greater. 
There was no evidence presented which would correlate % and or grams. 
There was no evidence presented which would even suggest that there was a correlation 
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which could be made. It is contrary to Utah Law for an individual to have a blood 
alcohol content measured in %. The law specifically requires that the blood-alcohol be 
measured in grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. The Information filed by the 
State and relied upon at the time of trial does not constitute a public offense. It is not 
the duty of this Court or of the jury to fill in any blanks or holes in the prosecution's 
case and especially an element of the offense. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-501 (1953, as amended) is directly at 
issue. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until 
each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct 
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense 
but shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Id. The State failed to prove all the elements of the crime at issue. An element of the 
crime is the blood-alcohol concentration. By statute the prohibited conducted is grams 
of alcohol per 100 mililiters of blood and not .08%. Therefore, the State failed to 
prove a violation of law and the trial court cured its failure by denying the motion to 
arrest judgment. This amounts to a violation of due process. The trial court 
determined that Mr. Breitweiser was "too narrow" in his focus on an element of the 
offense, (r. at 133(329}), and denied the same. The court should reverse this decision 
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for the State has failed to prove the correct element of the offense as a matter of law. 
In determining the correctness of this issue, State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 
994 (Utah App. 1989) added clarity. It been long standing and this court in Serpente 
stated: 
Because the facts of this case are undisputed, the sole issue on appeal is the 
construction of § 76-9-702.5. Therefore, we apply a correction of error standard. See, 
e.g., Forbes v. St. Mark's Hosp., 754 P.2d 933, 934 (Utah 1988). Moreover, 
'one of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is that the statute should be 
looked at as a whole and in light of the general purpose it was intended to serve; and 
should be so interpreted and applied as to accomplish that objective. In order to give 
the statute the implementation which will fulfill its purpose, reason and intention 
sometimes prevail over technically applied literalness.' 
State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Andrus v. Allred, 17 
Utah 2d 106, 404 P.2d 972, 974 (1965)). 
* * * * 
As set forth earlier in our opinion, basic rules of statutory construction demand that 
words be interpreted according to their plain meaning unless the context justifies a 
different interpretation. InreM.L.T., 746 P.2d 1179, 1180 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The 
phrase "act of gross lewdness" is not subject to a plain meaning, but rather must derive 
its definition from the context in which it appears. To this end, we resort to the 
doctrine of ejusdem generis. This doctrine provides that "where general words follow 
the enumeration of particular classes of things, the general words will be construed as 
applying only to things of the same general class as those enumerated." Black's Law 
Dictionary 464 (5th ed. 1979). Accordingly, we find this case analogous to the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Kennedy, 616 P.2d 594 (Utah 1980), wherein the 
defendant challenged his conviction of forcible sexual abuse. 4 The defendant claimed 
the phrase "or otherwise takes indecent liberties" was unconstitutionally vague. The 
Court rejected the challenge, and held that the phrase in question "refers to acts of 
equal magnitude of gravity to those specifically set forth in the statute...." Id at 597. 
See also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 481 (Utah 1988); InreL.G.W., 641 P.2d 
127, 129 (Utah 1982). "Viewing defendant's conduct in light of this construction, we 
are unable to say that the language... [is unconstitutionally vague]." Kennedy, 616 
P.2d at 597. 
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This plain error has deprived Mr. Breitweiser due process of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Breitweiser respectfully requests this Honorable Court to vacate the 
conviction as a matter of law. The trial court should have arrested the judgment and 
further the evidence should have been suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of 
May, 1998. 
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PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people 
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of 
free government, do ordain anc establish this CONSTITU-
TION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to vote or 
hold office.] 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.] 
7. [Due process of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 
[Trial by jury.] [Proposed.] 
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of war-
rant.] 
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
17. [Elections to be free — Soldic ? voting.] 
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.] 
19. [Treason defined — Proof] 
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
22. [Private property for public use.] 
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
Section 
25. [Rights retained by people.] 
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] 
Sect ion 1. [Inherent and inal ienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their con-
sciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of tha t 
right. 1896 
Sec. 2. [All polit ical power inherent in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare may require. 
1896 
Sec. 3 . [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal 
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the 
supreme law of the land. 1896 
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification 
to vote or hold office.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of public t rus t or for 
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No 
property qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 1896 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety requires it. 1896 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the 
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature 
from defining the lawful use of arms. 1984 (2nd as.) 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 1896 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable 
except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or 
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous 
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to 
support the new felony charge; or 
563 
Art. I, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 564 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated 
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd s.s.) 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish-
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in capital 
cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior 
jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases 
the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of 
the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. 1896 
[Trial by jury.] [Proposed.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
n6* fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. [1996] 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause ofthe accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part a t any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or a t any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment— 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without sue! 'examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grdnd jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant.] 
The right ofthe people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or ofthe press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
t ruth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury tha t the mat te r charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
shall a t any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote a t their 
post of duty, m or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post fac*p law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed. 1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent ofthe owner; nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation. 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity. 1896 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
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AMENDMENT I AMENDMENT VIII 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infnnged. 
AMENDMENT HI 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor*shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VH 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law. 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT K 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XH 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted 
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all per-
sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of 
the Government of the United States, directed to the Presi-
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all 
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for President, 
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have 
such majority, then from the persons having the highest 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immedi-
ately, by bahot, the President. But in choosing the President, 
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall 
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, 
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. 
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a 
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon 
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the 
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The 
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the 
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of 
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be 
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible 
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-
President of the United States. 
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AMENDMENT X m 
Section 
1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 




1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
eracy and claims not to be paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi-
cial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Con-
gress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the 
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
such disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, autho-
rized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color 
not to disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United Spates or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 




The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any 
census or enumeration. 
AMENDMENT XVTI 
[Election of senators.] 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six 
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in 
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors 
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. 
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State 
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue 
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the 
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to 
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacan-
cies by election as the legislature may direct. 
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the 
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid 
as part of the Constitution. 
AMENDMENT XVIII 
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933. SEE AMENDMENT 
XXI, SECTION 1 ] 
Section 
1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.] 
2. [Concurrent power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Time limit for adoption.] 
Section 1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating li-
quors.] 
After one year from the ratification of this article the 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors 
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof 
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(v) work accurately and reliably in an un-
supervised environment; 
(vi) resist tampering and give evidence if 
tampering is attempted; 
(vii) operate reliably over the range of mo-
tor vehicle environments; and 
(viii) be manufactured by a party who will 
provide liability insurance. 
(c) The commissioner may adopt in whole or in 
part, the guidelines, rules, studies, or indepen-
dent laboratory tests relied upon in certification 
of ignition interlock systems by other states. 
(d) A list of certified systems shall be published 
by the commissioner and the cost of certification 
shall be borne by the manufacturers or dealers of 
ignition interlock systems seeking to sell, offer for 
sale, or lease the systems. 
(e) In accordance with Section 63-38-3.2, the 
commissioner may establish an annual dollar 
assessment against the manufacturers of ignition 
interlock systems distributed in the state for the 
costs incurred in certifying. The assessment shall 
be apportioned among the manufacturers on a 
fair and reasonable basis. 
(13) There shall be no liability on the part of, and 
no cause of action of any nature shall arise against, 
the state or its employees in connection with the 
installation, use, operation, maintenance, or supervi-
sion of an interlock ignition system as required under 
this section. 1994 
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys for specified of-
fenses may prosecute for certain DUI 
offenses and driving while license is 
suspended or revoked. 
The following class A misdemeanors may be pros-
ecuted by attorneys of cities and towns, as well as by 
prosecutors authorized elsewhere in this code to pros-
ecute these alleged violations: 
(1) alleged class A misdemeanor violations of 
Section 41-6-44; and 
(2) alleged violations of Section 53-3-227, 
which consist of the person operating a vehicle 
while the person's driving privilege is suspended 
or revoked for a violation of Section 41-6-44, a 
local ordinance which complies with the require-
ments of Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Sec-
tion 76-5-207, or a criminal prohibition that the 
person was charged with violating as a result of a 
plea bargain after having been originally charged 
with violating one or more of those sections or 
ordinances. 1996 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests 
for alcohol or drug — Number of tests 
— Refusal — Warning, report — Hear-
ing, revocat ion of l i cense — Appeal — 
Person incapable of refusal — Results 
of test avai lable — Who may give test 
— Evidence . 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this 
state is considered to have given his consent to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine 
for the purpose of determining whether he was 
operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-
6-44 or 53-3-231, while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and 
any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having 
any measurable controlled substance or metabo-
lite of a controlled substance in the person's body 
in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or 
tests are administered at the direction of a peace 
officer having grounds to believe that person to 
have been operating or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Sec-
tion 41-6-44 or 53-3-231, or while under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of 
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or 
while having any measurable controlled sub-
stance or metabolite of a controlled substance in 
the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of 
the tests are administered and how many of 
them are administered. 
(ii) If an officer requests more than one 
test, refusal by a person to take one or more 
requested tests, even though he does submit 
to any other requested test or tests, is a 
refusal under this section. 
(c) d) A person who has been requested under 
this section to submit to a chemical test or 
tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not 
select the test or tests to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace offi-
cer to arrange for any specific chemical test is 
not a defense to taking a test requested by a 
peace officer, and it is not a defense in any 
criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding 
resulting from a person's refusal to submit to 
the requested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, 
has then been requested by a peace officer to 
submit to any one or more of the chemical tests 
under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to 
any chemical test requested, the person shall be 
warned by the peace officer requesting the test or 
tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests 
can result in revocation of the person's license to 
operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection 
(a), if the person does not immediately request 
tha t the chemical test or tests as offered by a 
peace officer be administered a peace officer shall 
serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver 
License Division, immediate notice of the Driver 
License Division's intention to revoke the person's 
privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. 
When the officer serves the immediate notice on 
behalf of the Driver License Division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or per-
mit, if any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for 
only 29 days; and 
(hi) supply to the operator, on a form ap-
proved by the Driver License Division, basic 
information regarding how to obtain a hear-
ing before the Driver License Division. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if 
approved as to form by the Driver License Divi-
sion, serve also as the temporary license. 
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed 
report, within five days after the date of the 
arrest, that he had grounds to beheve the ar-
rested person had been operating or was in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a 
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohib-
ited under Section 41-6-44 or 53-3-231, while 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or com-
bination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44, or while having any measurable con-
trolled substance or metabolite of a controlled 
substance in the person's body in violation of 
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Section 41-6-44.6, and that the person had re-
fused to submit to a chemical test or tests under 
Subsection (1). 
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the 
Driver License Division's intention to revoke 
his license under this section is entitled to a 
hearing. 
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made 
in writing within ten days after the date of 
the arrest. 
(iii) Upon written request, the division 
shall grant to the person an opportunity to be 
heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a timely 
written request for a hearing before the divi-
sion, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle 
in the state is revoked beginning on the 30th 
day after the date of arrest for a period of: 
(A) one year unless Subsection (B) ap-
plies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had a 
previous license sanction after July 1, 
1993, under this section, Section 41-6-
44.6, 53-3-223, or 53-3-231 or a convic-
tion after July 1, 1993, under Section 
41-6-44. 
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person and 
conducted by the Driver License Division, the 
hearing shall be documented and shall cover the 
issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable 
grounds to believe that a person was operat-
ing a motor vehicle in violation of Section 
41-6-44, 41-6-44.6, or 53-3-231; and 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit 
to the test. 
(g) (i) In connection with the hearing, the di-
vision or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may 
issue subpoenas for the attendance of 
witnesses and the production of relevant 
books and papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the at-
tendance of necessary peace officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and 
mileage from the Transportation Fund in 
accordance with the rates established in Sec-
tion 21-5-4. 
(h) If after a hearing, the Driver License Divi-
sion determines that the person was requested to 
submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to 
submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails to 
appear before the Driver License Division as 
required in the notice, the Driver License Divi-
sion shall revoke his license or permit to operate 
a motor vehicle in Utah beginning on the date the 
hearing is held for a period of: 
(i) (A) one year unless Subsection (B) ap-
plies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had a 
previous license sanction after July 1, 
1993, under this section, Section 53-3-
223, 41-6-44.6, or 53-3-231 or a convic-
tion after July 1, 1993, under Section 
41-6-44. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also 
assess against the person, in addition to any 
fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(14), a 
fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be 
paid before the person's driving privilege is 
reinstated, to cover administrative costs. 
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person 
obtains an unappealed court decision follow-
ing a proceeding allowed under this subsec-
tion that the revocation was improper. 
(i) (i) Any person whose license has been re-
voked by the Driver License Division under 
this section may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudi-
cative proceeding is a trial. Venue is in the 
district court in the county in which the 
person resides. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any 
other condition rendering him incapable of refusal to 
submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to 
not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Sub-
section (1), and the test or tests may be administered 
whether the person has been arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, 
the results of the test or tests shall be made available 
to him. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practi-
cal nurse, or person authorized under Section 
26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, 
may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or 
drug content. This limitation does not apply to 
taking a urine or breath specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical 
nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-
1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws 
a sample of blood from any person whom a peace 
officer has reason to believe is driving in violation 
of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at 
which the sample is drawn, is immune from any 
civil or criminal liability arising from drawing the 
sample, if the test is administered according to 
standard medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own 
expense, have a physician of his own choice ad-
minister a chemical test in addition to the test or 
tests administered at the direction of a peace 
officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the addi-
tional test does not affect admissibility of the 
results of the test or tests taken at the direction of 
a peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or 
tests to be taken at the direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to 
the test or tests administered at the direction of a 
peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to 
submit to a chemical test or tests, the person to be 
tested does not have the right to consult an attorney 
or have an attorney, physician, or other person 
present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a 
chemical test or tests or any additional test under this 
section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in any 
civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of 
acts alleged to have been committed while the person 
was operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, 
combination of alcohol and any drug, or while having 
any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of 
a controlled substance in the person's body. 1997 
41-6-44.20. Drinking alcohol ic beverage and 
open conta iners in motor vehic le pro-
hibited — Definit ions — Except ions . 
( D A person may not drink any alcoholic beverage 
while operating a motor vehicle or while a passenger 
in a motor vehicle, whether the vehicle is moving, 
stopped, or parked on any highway. 
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Rule 506. Physician and mental health therapist-patient 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) 'Tatient" means a person who consults or is examined or inter-
viewed by a physician or mental health therapist. 
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably believed by the 
patient to be licensed, to practice medicine in any state. 
(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or is reasonably 
believed by the patient to be licensed or certified in any state as a physi-
cian, psychologist, clinical or certified social worker, marriage and family 
therapist, advanced practice registered nurse designated as a registered 
psychiatric mental health nurse specialist, or professional counselor 
while that person is engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or 
emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addition. 
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information is communicated in confi-
dence and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a 
privilege, during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any 
other person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or ad-
vice given, by a physician or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained 
by examination of the patient, and (3) information transmitted among a pa-
tient, a physician or mental health therapist, and persons who are participat-
ing in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or 
mental health therapist, including guardians or members of the patient's 
family who are present to further the interest of the patient because they are 
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communications, or partici-
pation in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician or 
mental health therapist. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the 
patient, or the guardian or conservator of the patient. The person who was the 
physician or mental health therapist at the time of the communication is 
presumed to have authority during the life of the patient to claim the privi-
lege on behalf of the patient. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to a communica-
tion relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of 
the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any 
claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceedings in which 
any party relies upon the condition as an element of the claim or defense; 
(2) Hospitalization for mental illness. For communications relevant 
to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if 
the mental health therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has 
determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization; 
(3) Court ordered examination. For communications made in the 
course of, and pertinent to the purpose of, a court-ordered examination of 
the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient, whether a party 
or witness, unless the court in ordering the examination specifies other-
wise. 
(Amended effective July 1, 1994.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 506 is 
modeled after Rule 503 of the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence, and is intended to supersede Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-24-8(4) and 58-25a-8. There is 
no corresponding federal rule. By virtue of 
Rule 501, marriage and family therapists are 
not covered by this Rule. 
The differences between existing § 78-24-8 
and Rule 506 are as follows: 
(1) Rule 506 specifically applies to psycho-
therapists and licensed psychologists, it being 
the opinion of the Committee that full disclo-
sure of information by a patient in those set-
tings is as critical as and as much to be encour-
aged as in the physician" patient setting. The 
Utah Supreme Court requested that Rule 506 
further apply to licensed clinical social 
workers. To meet this request, the Committee 
included such individuals within the definition 
of psychotherapists. Under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-35-2(5), the practice of clinical social 
work "means the application of an established 
body of knowledge and professional skills in 
the practice of psychotherapy...'." Section 
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58-35-6 provides that "[n]o person may engage the direction of the physician or psychothera-
in the practice of clinical social work unless pist. For example, a certified social worker 
that person: (1) is licensed under this chapter practicing under the supervision of a clinical 
as a certified social worker," has the requisite social worker would be included. See Utah 
experience, and has passed an examination. Code Ann. § 58-35-6. 
Section 58-35-8(4) refers to licenses and certifi- The patient is entitled not only to refuse to 
cates for "clinical social workerfs]." As a result disclose the confidential communication, but 
of including clinical social workers, Rule 506 is also to prevent disclosure by the physician or 
intended to supplant Utah Code Ann. psychotherapist or others who were properly 
§ 58-35-10 in total for all social workers. involved or others who overheard, without the 
(2) Rule 506 applies to both civil and crimi- knowledge of the patient, the confidential com-
nal cases, whereas § 78-24-8 applies only to munication. Problems of waiver are dealt with 
civil cases. The Committee was of the opinion by Rule 507. 
that the considerations supporting the privi- The Committee felt that exceptions to the 
lege apply in both. privilege should be specifically enumerated, 
(3) In the Committee's original recommen- and further endorsed the concept that in the 
dation to the Utah Supreme Court, the pro- area of exceptions, the rule should simply state 
posed Rule 506 granted protection only to con- that no privilege existed, rather than express-
fidential communications, but did not extend ing the exception in terms of a *Svaiver" of the 
the privilege to observations made, diagnosis privilege. The Committee wanted to avoid any 
or treatment by the physician/psychotherapist, possible clashes with the common law concepts 
The Committee was of the opinion that while of "waiver." 
the traditional protection of the privilege The Committee did not intend this rule to 
should extend to confidential communications, limit or conflict with the health care data stat-
as is the case in other traditional privileges, utes listed in the Committee Note to Rule 501. 
the interests of society in discovering the truth Rule 506 is not intended to override the child 
during the trial process outweigh any counter- abuse reporting requirements contained in 
vailing interests in extending the protection to Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4-501 et seq. 
observations made, diagnosis or treatment. The 1994 amendment to Rule 506 was pri-
However, the Supreme Court requested that marily in response to legislation enacted dur-
the scope of the privilege be broadened to in- ing the 1994 Legislative General Session that 
elude information obtained by the physician or changed the licensure requirements for certain 
psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or mental health professionals. The rule now 
treatment, whether obtained verbally from the covers communications with additional li-
patient or through the physician's or psycho- censed professionals who are engaged in treat-
therapist's observation or examination of the ment and diagnosis of mental or emotional con-
patient. The Court further requested that the ditions, specifically certified social workers, 
privilege extend to diagnosis, treatment, and marriage and family therapists, specially des-
advice. To meet these requests, the Committee ignated advanced practice registered nurses 
relied in part on language from the California and professional counselors, 
evidentiary privileges involving physicians Some mental health therapists use the term 
and psychotherapists. See Cal. Evid. Code "client" rather than "patient," but for simplic-
§§ 992 and 1012. These features of the rule ity this rule uses only "patient." 
appear in subparagraphs (a)(4) and (b). The The committee also combined the definition 
Committer also relied on language from Uni- of confidential communication and the general 
form Rule of Evidence 503. rule section, but no particular substantive 
Upon the death of the patient, the privilege change was intended by the reorganization, 
ceases to exist. Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
The privilege extends to communications to ment substituted "mental health therapist" for 
the physician or psychotherapist from other "psychotherapist" throughout the rule; substi-
persons who are acting in the interest of the tuted "licensed" for "authorized" and "state" 
patient, such as family members or others who for "state or nation" in Subdivision (a)(2); re-
may be consulted for information needed to wrote Subdivision (a)(3); deleted former Subdi-
help the patient. vision (a)(4), which defined "confidential com-
The privilege includes those who are partici- munication"; rewrote Subdivision (b); and 
pating in the diagnosis and treatment under made stylistic changes. 
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Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi- tending to patient's medical or hospital 
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A.L.R. — Physician-patient privilege as ex-
Rule 507. Miscellaneous matters. 
(a) A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of 
the confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if the person or 
a predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to 




DUI REPORT FORM 
CASE IDENTIFICATION: . „ ~ _ -
Date ff- 6 - 7 ^ Day -friJdu, Accident U& Case # ^ - ^ / ^ ^ T i m e Prepared 2f</3 
Subject's Name U^n. N~fih>i4usk+r~ / Address 442 CccJhy Cf«b, St*-*ibf»,y &,£ U(^L ^ c - - y 
Place of Employment Address , 
Home Telephone Number Work Telephone Number 
DOB "7- /o - Q J Driver License Number /4 / 9 £ 7 f 7 3 Time_ of Arrest cfoyjT 
Place of Arrest <>&'5) - ln«P 4/ Charges 0 ,„__. „ 
Arresting Officer # ^ ^ ^ 7 Arresting Agency PieL &~Jk. Shtiiff \ off ^ if-
Assisting Officers X U ^ &^u<A^t tkxrw ff*ya , 
II. VEHICLE . A j 
Year fflZ Color ftCQU/*s Make /Zrf Model ncfcrf 
License # and State T o 9 ^ RL Disposition J ^ j a x < W ^ / Y 77ft, <W/ ) 
Registered Owner 6 ^ / £U,.~-e / J f . A / ^ r Address <J</7 < ^ ~ / ~ . Cbb- 5-h-sL^ tL.k 
III. WITNESSES: (If passengers, indicate specifically) 






IV. ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL: , 
The facts establishing the subject's actual physical control of a motor vehicle are: UPhicif MA{ i,<J*t 
H< *(& ke JAXii Ike aJy j*»/s«^ ^ -tLe (,d><rfi>. 
V. DRIVING PATTERN: 
Subject's location when first observed 
The facts observed regarding driving pattern: 
VI. PRE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT: 
VII. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
Odor of alcoholic beverage I^U tfaffrCti, 
Speech 
Balance 
Signs or complaints of injury or illness fat h>2^ lAMiluiJ ,\v ^ *(£ S<j*d w - W t ^ . I I*JUWY$ 
Other nhvsical character ictirc J ther physical characteristics 
FIELD SOBRIbTY TESTS: (Describe subjects actions) 
1 
Were tests demonstrated by officer? Subject's ability to follow instructions 
SEARCHES 
A Vehicle . . 
Where? HCOA^KA S^-e^t Was subject's vehicle searched? w^> 
When? /4fW A»WJ,W,V UU Elide idence -3 g ^ U , R~r b,tfi^T 
Person who performed the search "S[v*v f w u o / ^ ( p^v-c Sk<x-e^ 
CHEMICAL TESTS: 
Mr or Ms ty>gt"w<tSi>&_ , do you understand that you are under arrest for 
f Driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs or with a measurable amount of a controlled substance or metabolite in your body? (41-6-44, 41-6-44 6 UCA) 
• An alcohol offense under 21 years of age in violation of 32A-12-209 UCA? 
Response (if any) 
I hereby request that you submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol (drug) content of your 
blood/breath I request that you take a fc)(QgtA test 
breath- urine) 
Q] The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was administered 
Test results indicating an unlawful amount of alcohol or a controlled substance or its metabolite in your 
breath/blood/unne in violation of Utah Law, or the presence of alcohol and/or drugs sufficient to render you 
incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle may, result in denial, suspension, or disqualification of your driving 
privilege or refusal to issue you a license 
What is your response to my request that you submit to a chemical test? Response 
Did subject submit tp a chemical test? Type of test 
Test Administered by Where? 
Time Results Was subject notified of results? 
Serial No of test instrument 
(if the subject refuses the test, read the following) 
The following admonition was given by me to the subject 
If you refuse the test or fail to follow my instructions, the test will not be given However, I must warn you 
that your driving privilege may be revoked for one year for a first refusal or 18 months for a subsequent 
refusal after July 1, 1993, with no provision for limited driving After you have taken the test, you will be 
permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer a test at your own expense, in addition to the 
one I have requested, so long as it does not delay the test or tests requested by me I will make the test 
results available to you if you take the test 
Unless you immediately request a test, the test cannot be given Response, if any 
(if the subject claims right to remain silent or the right to cou 1^, read the following) 
D The following admonition was given by me to the subject: 
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law which is civil in 
nature and separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain silent does not give you the right to 
refuse to take the test. You do not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure. Unless you 
submit to the test I am requesting, I will consider that you have refused to take the test. I warn you that if 
you refuse to take the test, your driver's license can be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited 
license. 
XI. INTERVIEW 
Was subject advised of the following rights? When? _ 
By Whom Where? 
1. You have the right to remain silent. 
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. 
3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being 
questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before 
any questioning, if you wish one. 
4. If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop answering 
questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during questioning. 
Were the following waiver questions asked? 
1. Do you understand each of these right I have explained to you? 
Response 
2. Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now? 
Response 
Were you operating vehicle? 
Where were you going? 
What street or highway were you on? 
Direction of travel? 
Where did you start from? _ 
When? What time is it now? 
What is today's date? Day of week? 
(Actual time Date Day of Week? ) 
What city or county are you in now? 
What were you doing during the last three hours? 
Have you been drinking? 
What? How much? 
Where? 
When did you have your first drink? Last drink? 
Are you under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (drugs) now? 
Are you taking tranquilizers, pills, medicines or drugs of any kind? 
(What kind? Get sample) 
When did you have the last dose? 
Are you ill? ___ 
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions:) 
Were you involved in an accident today? 
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident? 
If so, what? When? 
How much? 
OTHER OCCURRENCES L FACTS: 
T (awQ a.cfdSS ±UP U-ehK.l* o~ /Sjular jia.trel. JX~/ 6^ /trl offr -/A-g 
^(./iiiA^-A. \JP LJPI? tKJoU 4oys( Lv* *,A-f: T" rc^y rtHf/f q/cc/tt/ <=T~ dim, 
b/cot/. {4? *vgyf "ftf -ffcMXpo/jeJ / o £~ix*<Ak^ /^../o.urjl t/oS&hf. •77Te 
OUT r.'^4,vc/^ iA/g\ W ^ J / » J I^M/U ^/u ^ 1 "76, oA -f^-e H*>i4''ifnl ^ 
W . 
ATTACHED DOCUMENTS: 
I have attached the following documents to this report: 
1. H Copy of citation/temporary license 
2. CS Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit 
3. H^ Traffic accident report 
4. j f t , Other documents (specify) & % \ ^ ^ f l ) ^ 
I hereby certify that I am a sworn Utah Peace Officer. Special Function Officer, or Port-of-Entry Agent and 
that the information contained above in this report form and attached documents is true and correct to my 
knowledge and belief and that this report form was prepared in the regular course of my duties. It is my 
belief the subject was in violation of Section 41-6-44. 41-6-44.4. 41-6-44.6. 32A-12-209, or 53-3-418 UCA 
at the time, and place specified in this report. 
Signature of Officer $/Agent ^ * 
Agency: Kicl\ CrcZUi SkvfHQr / ^ / ^ v ? u T 
The original of this form and the Driver License copy of the Citation must be 
sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to: 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION 
PO BOX 30560 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84130-0560 
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7? PLACE WHEF<E & , ACCIDENT OCCURRED: COUNTY K<C U I 
FOR AGENCY USE 
CITY O R T O W N . 
17 
Accident was outside city limits *j 
indicate distance Irom city limits or nearest town f I 
N O R T H S E W 
MILES D D D X ) of (AAJfu^ D L.D. USE ONLY 
CITY OR TOWN 18 
2 
ROAD ON WHICH T^TZ^Z 
ACCIDENT OCCURRED: ? c T ? 
RAMP NO. 
• GIVE NAME OF STREET OR HIGHWAY NUMBER INTERSECTION T Y P E 




2. IF NOT AT INTERSECTION. 
NORTH 
D ^L TENTH Of A MILE &Jp 
NORTH S E 




NEAREST INTERSECTION. STREET. HOUSE NO. LANDMARK 
BE S U R E T O C O M P L E T E IF R O A D HAS MILE P O S T 
A 
2 1 1 
K 
2 2 1 
1 VEHICLE YEAR MAKE A . / I (?X? I Grr! 
VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 
MODEL BODY STYLE/TYPE CODE VEHI£LE COLOR 
' I DISPOSITION OF VEHICLE 
G.V.W.R. DESC. OF CARGO 
CODE 
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE (Reg 12.0001». w mo*) 
INTERSTATE D INTRASTATE D 
lFTHPaSA50*Ao%7>7 
NO OF AXLES 
(WaUOtNO Al l TPUtCRS) 
CODE 
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FIRST INITIAL LAST 
4ir<uo / Pafap 
* * 
j&& ifjehev. 
STREET, CfTY. STATE, ZIP, PHONE NO. PHONE( ) 
HH& (lurtti* CJuh. Skirt\}i*«u fi^kj tA.feSs 
1 \ V 
FIRST INITIAL LAST STREET, CITY, STATE, ZIP, PHONE NO. PHONE( ) 
DRIVER 
L oS\ 1L deal reiser 
I MONTH DAY YEA*| I T I INJURY | > 4 | g I STATE DUMBER 
DRIVERS 
LICENSE Mil HftSfrys 
ORTVER-8 
EDUCATION] 
1. PUBLIC 3. NONE 










07 /o iff 
6 P9l *% c 
w 
1 m 5 
THROUGH WHAT 
AREA EJECTED? y" 
L { , M £ / M X W 
29 
INSURANCE COMPANY EFFECTIVE DATE EXPIRATION DATE POLICY NUMBER 




INSURANCE APPEARS VAUD AGENCY THAT SOLD POLICY 
U 1 ^  -Cos 
ADDRESS 
^ C t f O y 
™ ^ / » ^ ^ ^ l 3, 
MAKE IODEL YSTYL^TYPECODE VEHICLE COLOR G.V.W.R. DESC. OF CARGO 
CODE 
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE (R«g 12.000t» or mort) 
INTERSTATE D I N T R A S T A T E D 
321 
33 VEHICLE 
DISPOSITION OF VEHICLE 
CODE 
NO. OF AXLES 
(MCLUDMQ A U I R A U f M ) 
DIROFTRAVa 
P'AGRAM WHAT HAPPENED BELOW. 
Hea*on For No Diagram 
CAS^ NUMBER 
1 Officer not at scent 





VEHICLE NO.. I . N O _ 
ESTIMATED TRAVEL SPEEO 











INDICATE INTERSECTION TYPE 
If Hazardous Materials were involved 
list the placard number from off the 
commercial vehicle: 
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY 
OTHER THAN VEHICLES. R/jce 
Name object and state nature and amount ol damage 




Name . Address. 
. P h o n e . 
. Phone . 
1 FIRST Art) ADMINISTERED BY l¥lrVWTM-
I • Potceman 
2'Fireman 
3'Ambutace 
4 • Paramedics 
5*Doctor 
6 • Private Individual 
7-Hospital 
0 • Helicopter Personnel 
9 • None Administered 
0-Unknown 
isoo/q m 
|M| w *wr wo 
INJURED TAKEN BY 
1-Ambulance, Private 
2- Ambulance, Fire 
3- Paramedics 
4* Private Vehicle 
5- Helicopter 
6-Other 
TIME: Amb. Called:. .Arrived:. 




Montfi Day Year 
Q2Q5 
i y Y e a r 
Tune Notified ol Accident 
Source of Informatjpn 












Nam. <kmj H KcvfrvHiSer- . Charge: « ? / - * - * < / » O r ! ^ U*J* 7U/*«VC* c f & . L 4 
Name 
CVSA Inspection Y e a . 
Other action taken , 
No. X-
. Charge: 
If Yea. Report Number . 
P R I N T . b/e s4ctc^f )£2 
OFFICER'S BANK AND NAME I.O. NO. PATROL DIVISION 
Ktcln &> ±& 
DEPARTMENT SUPERVISORS APPROVAL] 
2zJ£2k. 
DATE OF REPORT 
SUte U w requires that report be forwarded to Dept. of Public Safety within 10 days following completion of the Investigation. Mall ORIGINAL OF REPORT TO: 
ADDENDUM C 
1 breath. 
2 THE JUDGE: Mr. Oliver, I'm going to 
3 give you some grounds for appeal if you so desire. 
4 But I'm going to deny your motion to suppress and 
5 in so doing I'll rule that under 41-6-44.101(a), it 
6 applies here. And I'll rule that the officer had 
7 grounds to believe that the defendant had been 
8 operating a motor vehicle while having the blood or 
9 breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited. 
10 And I, I accept your argument. I accept the 
11 argument there was not probable cause to arrest the 
12 defendant at that point in time. But I don't 
13 think I'm going to separate those two. I don't 
14 think that that prohibits the police officer from, 
15 from inquiring, from administering the tests at 
16 that point in time. I think you've got an implied 
17 consent at that point. 
18 Now the defendant could have refused and 
19 if he had of refused then he had to be arrested for 
20 || (2) to apply. Then that police officer has to 
21 || have probable cause at that point in time. 
22 || In other words, I don't think the arrest 
23 || under these circumstances made any difference 
24 || because of this 44 - 1 - 44 . 101 (a) . And if I'm 
25 || incorrect in that I guess I'll give you some 
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May I just point one thing 
1 II grounds for an appeal . 
2 II MR. OLIVER: 
3 || out to the Court? 
4 II THE JUDGE: You may. 
5 MR. OLIVER: This having grounds to 
6 believe does not lessen-- And I don't know. I 
7 apologize. I don't know if the Court wants us to 
8 stand or sit and I don't know what the Court's--
9 THE JUDGE: Yes. Whatever you're most 
10 comfortable at. 
11 MR. OLIVER: Okay. I don't know. I 
12 don't believe that this provision of the statute is 
13 intended to decrease the provisions of the 
14 Constitution which require probable cause. 
15 But aside from that and just moving on 
16 down, reading from where it says: 
17 "... officer having grounds to 
18 believe that person to have been operating 
19 or in actual physical control of a motor 
20 II vehicle . . . " . 
21 || Now the next part becomes critical. Not 
22 || just the standard that the Court has looked at but 
23 || we need to look at what standard we're trying to 
24 || determine. 
25 || "... while having a blood or breath 
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1 alcohol content statutorily 
2 prohibited.". 
3 In other words, the officer has to have 
4 made the determination. This is not an 
5 investigatory tool but the officer has to have 
6 already made the determination that he isn't, that 
7 he is driving or in actual physical control of a 
8 motor vehicle with a blood or breath alcohol 
9 content statutorily, statutorily prohibited under 
10 statute 41-6-44 or 53-32-31 or while under the 
11 influence of alcohol, any drug or combination of 
12 alcohol and any drugs under Section 41-6-44, or 
13 while having any measurable controlled substance or 
14 metabolite of a controlled substance in the 
15 person's body in violation of 44-6-44.6. 
16 Each one of these require the officer make 
17 the determination that there has been a violation 
18 of that particular statutory provision. So when we 
19 talk about having grounds it goes not just to the 
20 odor of alcohol and the accident. But it goes to 
2 1 II the fact that the officer must have grounds to 
22 || believe that there is a violation of one of those 
23 || specific code provisions enumerated therein. 
24 || And so I think that, that puts having 
25 || grounds on the level with the probable cause 
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1 II because he's got to believe that there's a 
2 || violation of law. He's not just investigating or 
3 || attempting to make a determination as to whether or 
4 II not there's been a violation. He has to already 
5 believe that and then, and it has to be as to one 
6 of these statutory provisions, and then proceed. 
7 That's what we're talking about because that's 
8 where the implied consent law comes in is after you 
9 have been validly arrested for violation, that's 
10 where the implied consent comes in. It doesn't 
11 kick in before then. 
12 In other words, if I walk out of this 
13 courthouse and the officer says Bruce, I want you 
14 to submit to a chemical test, and he's not arrested 
15 me, he has no reason to believe that I'm under the 
16 influence of alcohol, does my implied consent say 
17 that I then at that point in time have to submit to 
18 the, to the blood or breath or urine test upon 
19 their request? No, not until I've been 
20 arrested. Not until there's probable cause for 
21 II that. That's what that says. He has to have 
22 || this grounds to believe there's been a violation of 
23 II the law on the specific code provisions. 
24 || Otherwise, they could ask anybody and there's not a 
25 || thing anybody could do about it, you, me, 
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1 II Mr. Preston or anybody else. You've got to have 
2 || the valid arrest first. That's what kicks the 
3 || implied consent law and makes it, activates it and 
4 II puts it into effect. 
5 THE JUDGE: You make a strong argument, 
6 Counsel but I, I won't accept it. The difference 
7 is, is that it's a grounds to believe which I think 
8 would rise to reasonable suspicion as opposed to 
9 probable cause and I'll so rule. And I will rule, 
10 however that I find that in this case it was not 
11 probable cause to make the arrest. There's a 
12 reasonable suspicion to believe or--
13 MR. OLIVER: To investigate. 
14 THE JUDGE: -- grounds to believe that he 
15 had consumed alcohol and was under the influence. 
16 And I'll, and I'll make that ruling so 
17 that if you'd like to take that up we'll have the 
18 appellate court decide whether I'm right or wrong 
19 and your argument's applicable. 
20 II MR. OLIVER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
21 || THE JUDGE: Very well. Now with that I 
22 || assume we're ready to proceed with the jury trial. 
23 || MR. OLIVER: May we, may we-- I have, 
24 || based upon the arguments that have been made here 
25 || today I've previously indicated to the Court that 
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1 || I've received the police reports and my information 
2 || is based upon the police reports. There's been 
3 || some additional information that's been brought out 
4 II this morning that I think is critical. May we 
5 approach the bench--
6 THE JUDGE: You may. Certainly. 
7 MR. OLIVER: -- just briefly. I'd like 
8 it on the record but at the same time I, I would 
9 like it as if the Exclusionary Rule were in 
10 effect. I don't want to discuss it in front of the 
11 witnesses. 
12 THE JUDGE: We can handle that, 
13 Mr. Oliver. What we'll do is we'll take a 
14 microphone in chambers and we'll, let's go in 
15 chambers. 
16 MR, OLIVER: Or if we could just have the 
17 witnesses clear the courtroom, I would have no 
18 problem with that. 
19 THE JUDGE: Very well. Let's-- Who 
20 are your witnesses that are present? Record 
21 should reflect that all of the prospective 
22 witnesses have left the courtroom. 
23 Very well. Go ahead, Mr. Oliver. 
24 MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, one of the 
25 things that came out in discussion this morning, 
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ADDENDUM D 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant of driving and/or being in 
actual physical control with a breath and/or blood alcohol content of 
.08 grams or greater you must find from the evidence, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of the crime, to wit: 
1. That the defendant was operating and/or in actual physical 
control of a vehicle at the time and place as alleged in the 
Information. 
2 . That while operating said vehicle or while being in actual 
physical control of said vehicle, at the time and place 
alleged, he had a .08 gram breath alcohol content or greater. 
3. That the said place was in Rich County, State of Utah^ 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the 
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is 
your duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if the 
evidence has failed to so establish one or more of the said elements, 
then you should find the defendant not guilty. 
7G 
George Preston 
Rich County Attorney 
Randolph, Utah 84064 
IN THE RICH PRECINCT COURT OF RICH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
LARRY H. BREITWEISER 
DOB 7/10/41 
Defendant. 
The STATE OF UTAH, upon evidence and belief, charges the above-named 
Defendant with the commission of the following offense(es): 
COUNT I: 
CRIME: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
IN VIOLATION OF: SECTION 41-6-44 U.C.A. 1953, AS AMENDED 
CLASSIFICATION; Class B Misdemeanor 
AT: Rich County State of Utah 
ON OR ABOUT: SEPTEMBER 6, 1996 
The acts of the defendant constituting the public offense were: 
That the defendant, LARRY H. BREITWEISER, a person whose operated a vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or the combined influence of alcohol 
or drugs to a degree which rendered the person incapable of safely operating the 
vehicle. 
- AND/OR-
That the Defendant operated or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
within Rich County with a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater. 
INFORMATION 
This information is based on evidence from the following witness(es): 
DALE STACEY, RICH COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF, KERRY STACEY AND JIM 
GREGORY. 
DATED: OCTOBER &£> . 1996. 
DATE FILED: OCOTBER 
